US Intervention in Somalia, 1992 Essay Example for Free

US Intervention in Somalia, 1992 Essay The 1992-1993 intervention of the US forces, with UN authorization, in the fractured country of Somalia is a complex issue not just in terms of Somalian domestic politics, but also the constellation of foreign entanglements that were involved in this strategic part of the world. This brief essay will attempt to answer some key questions about the conflict itself, the American role and the diplomatic and power struggles internationally, especially given the strategic location of Somalia on the Indian Ocean trade routes and the controlling interest in the mouth of the Red Sea. The conflict itself is rather straightforward. The dictatorship of Said Barre was an eccentric one, since he attempted to combine the Islamic movement with that of Marxian socialism. But Barre, in this tribally fractured society, found himself at loggerheads with the powerful Hawiye tribe, as well as certain Islamic factions operating within the country, eventually to develop the Somali National Alliance (SNA), which, for reasons to be described below, became the main target of the American wrath. Concerning the basic structure of the conflict using the typology of Kriesberg, his concern for â€Å"interests and values† is very important, since the basic struggle, outside of its tribal basis, was one of independence from the west. If the SNA were to be victorious, than the US might well be shut out of this strategic area, and a hostile power would come into play, just when the US had helped oust the hated Marxist dictator in Ethiopia, Mengistu Hailie Maram. It is the contention of this writer that this specific reason underlies the entire US intervention in 1992-1993. But apart from interests and values, it seems that the Civil War in Somalia was a zero-sum battle, in that the Islamic movement had a very different agenda than the pro-Ethiopian movement. The victory of one meant the automatic loss for the other. The organizations themselves were both tribal and ideological, centering around the destiny of Somalia relative to the Arab-Israeli conflict, where the Muslims rejected the US presence in support of Israeli interests and the pro-western side sought to use Ethiopia to eliminate the Islamic movement of General Farah Adeed. Hence, in Kriesberg’s terms, these organizations were basically bi-focal, with two mutually exclusive agendas that eventually, in 1993, permitted the US government to hold that the Islamic movement is the great threat to Somalia (cf Kreisberg’s typology, 2006, 7-14). Now, the basic issues in the conflict concern, first of all, the actors themselves. After the disastrous war with Ethiopia in the late 1980s, the Barre regime in Somalia tottered, and eventually was overthrown by an military organization, backed largely by the Hawaye tribe, the United Somali Congress (USC). They overthrew Barre, but were incapable of managing the post-war world. Hence, the development of the Civil War and the rise of Addid’s SNA. The CIA maintained a major post in Kenya, and the US maintained a air base in Ethiopia where spy planes can traverse the Middle East (Griswold, 2007). After the overthrow of the communist DERG state in Ethiopia in 1991, the western backed government intervened regularly in the conflict within the US frame of reference. Hence, it seems that the American approach was to either restore Barre in power or create a coalition of anti-Adeed forces (preferably led by militia leader Ali Mahdi (US Army, 10). None of this worked, and Adeed seemed to emerge from the conflict victorious, as he played upon the anti-colonialist struggle against the United States and successfully engendered hatred against the US (Kaemph, 2007). Therefore, in general, the Somali war pitted Adeed’s forces against both the Ethiopians and the United States. In addition, the state of Eritrea was also involved, and received both Israeli and American backing from its independence against he former communist government of Ethiopia. Hence, the Eritreans were used against the Adeed government and the state itself became a base for the anti-Islamic movement. Eritrea was very useful for the United States and Israel (who certainly had an interest in the Red Sea being open to western trade), since they fought with the Islamic government of Sudan, and became a part of the peace-keeping efforts of the US in that country, also with the ultimate purpose to eliminate the influence of the anti-US and anti-Israeli Islamic movement. Hence, the causes of the conflict and the American intervention are woven within the functioning of the actors themselves within an international context. To put it simply: the US, the UN and Israel supported Ethiopia and Eritrea (though these two have fought in the past), as well as what was left of the Barre regime. Barre himself had offered several oil concessions to American oil firms not to long before his overthrow, and hence, the major oil firms and the US government had an interest in his movement, discredited thought it was (Kretzman, 2003). The major purpose was to keep any coalition that could be formed by Adeed and the anti-US forces under both a nationalist and Islamic banner. The US Army holds in its official account of the war that psychological operations (PSYOPS) were the order of the day in the Somali countryside. This ominous methodology is not elaborated upon in the Army’s description of events (US Army, pub 70-81-1, p 10). At the same time, the CIA was providing the basic logistical support for the intervention out of Kenya. Given this background, the major issues that motivated the American intervention might be reduced to four. First, the control of any oil found in Somalia and, more importantly, the massive oil reserves of Sudan. The two conflicts are very similar in that both Omar Bashir and Adeed are anti-US and anti-Israel, and are fighting for a country that has at least some oil reserves that can be exploited. Secondly, both the US and Israel have an interest in keeping Islamic movements out of power in this strategic area, since such movements may well join with Iran and Russia against American oil interest in the area. Third, to maintain a secular and pro-western state in both Ethiopia and Eritrea. Fourth, to keep friendly powers in charge of Somalia in order to keep both the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean free of hostile powers, since major shipping goes though these areas, and importantly, oil shipping. But similarly, this is all based on a certain geography: Somalia is highly strategic for the above reasons–this eastern horn of Africa sits upon oil and major shipping lanes that cannot fall to hostile powers. But the area of the US intervention, it should be noted, only developed in the extreme south and west of the country, not accidentally the area bordering Kenya, where the CIA maintains a large base and listening post (Griswold, 2007). The US, as part of its PSYOP mentality, hit the radio stations belonging to Adeed, as well as attempting–unsuccessfully–to harm his infrastructure. The reality of the situation is, in the chaos of the war, the Islamic movement of Adeed developed his own social services and social infrastructure, not unlike Hamas in Palestine. To destroy this became the main purpose of the 1992-1993 intervention and largely dictated the popular hostility of the masses to American intervention. Adeed successfully created his own anti-PSYOP mentality by holding the Islamic faith and using nationalist ideas to mobilize the country to his cause. Hence, the nonsense about feeding the â€Å"starving masses† should not even be taken seriously, since the only man who successfully rebuilt at least a modicum of social services became the main target of US attacks (Kaemph, 2007). Hence, several things can be said in conclusion. First, oil is an important issue here, both in Sudan and Somalia. This is one of the most important motivating influences behind the intervention in 1992. But this oil is not sitting in the ground, it is being shipped worldwide, and hence, the Indian Ocean routes near Africa and the Red Sea both need to be kept open, and hence, Somalia, Eritrea and Ethiopia are central actors here. Second, the Eritreans were encouraged in their independence drive under the communist DERG state in Ethiopia by both the US and Israel so as to maintain a pro-western state there. Eritrea hence, sought to support the US in the conflict with the purpose of maintaining its independence and legitimacy. The Islamic forces in Sudan and the SNA wanted an Islamic and nationalist state to fight the west and the Israelis. For the US, this was unacceptable and might be the central issue in the entire American mentality of the time. The reality is that Adeed won–and he won using anti-colonial rhetoric that saw the US as invaders, not interveners. Third, the American PSYOP organization, with CIA backing fizzled. They failed to convince the population that the US was their friend. The very fact that Adeed’s own infrastructure was attacked proved to most that the US was there for the sake of realpolitik, not humanitarian aid, a rather silly â€Å"official† story from Washington, given the strategic nature of the area. Since PSYOPS are little more than brainwashing, Adeed certainly seems to have the moral high ground here–he had the money and the power, as well as the support and military training to make his movement work. Insofar as Kriesberg’s organization typology (cf pg 12), the reason for the American intervention is that it seemed that Adeed’s forces could not be beaten. His main opponent, and a recipient of US money, Mahdi, had no real military training and was no match for Adeed (US Army, 10). The former forces of Barre were also fractured and demoralized, and hence, to keep Adeed out of power, intervention was necessary. But what remains central is that the official reason for the American involvement was not only false, but laughable. Not even an armchair analysis could hold that humanitarianism was the central issue when which globally strategic issues were at stake. An Islamic government in Sudan and Somalia could spell doom for the American interest in the shipping lanes of the area, and might well serve to harm the states of Ethiopia or Eritrea. Israel’s interest were also central, since the US presence in northeastern Africa is substantial and is a major base for operations against he enemies of the Israeli state such as Iraq (formerly) and Iran, not to mention Sudan or even Libya. The US, in short, appeared as an amoral colonial invader against the genuinely popular Adeed forces. Ultimately, the Somalia failure proved the problematic nature of American post-Cold War foreign policy. First, her official rationale made little sense. Second, the simple battle for American interests will not win the US forces respect throughout the world (Allard, 1995). The nations of the world will work out their own problems without CIA meddling, which only rarely provides a lasting solution (though few could doubt that the fall of Mengistu in Ethiopia was not a good thing). But lastly, what seems to come out of the Somalia failure is the simple fact that the US drive for global empire is doomed to fail, and what should come out of the decay of the bi-polar world is not a uni-polar world or even an multi-lateral one, but the simple concept of self determination for all the nations and people’s of the world according to their own lights, not dictates from Brussels, New York or Washington. Bibliography: Allard, K.. (2005) Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. Washington: National Defense Griswold, Diedre (Jan 7, 2007) â€Å"Why Somalia has no National State. † Workers World. http://www. workers. org/2007/world/somalia-0111/ (This is a communist publication that should be taken with a grain of salt but it does have some interesting observations about the CIA’s role in the area, as well as Israel’s) Kriesberg, L. (2006). Constructive Conflicts. Rowman and Littlefield. Kretzman, Steve (2003). Oil Security, War and the Geopolitics of United States Energy Planning. Multinational Monitor, Jan/Feb. (http://www. thirdworldtraveler. com/Oil_watch/Oil_Security_War. html) United States Army (nd). The US Army in Somalia. CHM Publication 70-81-1